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LOYALTY: AN EsSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS. By 
George P. Fletcher. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. 
xii, 211. $21. 
It is disconcerting to open a book subtitled An Essay on the Moral-
ity of Relationships and find that the two case studies that most interest 
the author are reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools and 
the criminalization of flag burning. Although George Fletcher1 begins 
to make his case for giving moral priority to loyalties by referring to 
the impulse to save one's mother from a burning house (p. 12), he is 
more concerned with the ties that bind individuals to groups than with 
the ethics of relationships between individuals. The loyalties to which 
Fletcher would give "moral importance" (p. ix) are those among peo-
ple who share a common culture (p. xi). Yet, as is apparent in his 
opening reference to the imperiled mother, Fletcher wishes to ground 
those more far-reaching loyalties in the feelings inspired by family inti-
macy. The organization of the book assumes that the emotions felt in 
these two quite different contexts are analogous. In drawing out that 
analogy, Fletcher assumes that his own rather idiosyncratic views 
about family and state are widely shared. This results in a very con-
fusing book, one that often leaves its conclusions obscure because it 
proceeds by assertion and assumption more than argument. 
In the introduction, Fletcher states that Loyalty represents a new 
direction in his thinking. His previous philosophical work was con-
cerned with "the Kantian theory of law and morality" (p. ix). Conver-
sations during the mid-1980s with a friend who is a rabbi led Fletcher 
to believe that any ethical theory built upon impartiality is seriously 
limited. In this book he argues that the dominance of "impartial eth-
ics," whether Kantian or utilitarian, has done great damage by under-
cutting the sense of obligation that individuals ought to feel toward 
groups. Our political life is impoverished, he claims, because impartial 
ethics encourage individuals to seek personal solutions, such as exiting 
a difficult situation, rather than to resolve problems through group 
action.2 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1968, M.A. 1970, J.D. 1974, Michigan. 
-Ed. 
1. Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
2. Fletcher is not only concerned about the tendency of people to look for individual solu· 
tions, such as exit from institutions, but also about the tendency to adopt the values of the mar-
ketplace in which loyalties are shifted to the highest bidders. In reference to his own profession, 
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Fletcher's main critique of impartial ethics, however, is that they 
are unsuited to the real world. His argument is not entirely clear. At 
one point he seems to claim that impartial ethics do not speak to the 
problems of human interaction. He argues, for example, that impar-
tial ethics have the most "to teach the solitary individual, living in 
isolation from others" (p. 14). But he also seems to understand that 
the force of these ethical systems, their very impartiality, lies in the 
notion "that respecting the distinguishing feature of one's own exist-
ence ... is no less important than respecting these qualities in others" 
(p. 14)- an odd ethical stance for someone who has no dealings with 
other human beings. 
Fletcher offers a second, more coherent, critique: impartial ethical 
systems, by insisting on a disinterested perspective, require people to 
act like utopian figures in a perfect world, rather than historically situ-
ated human beings. Impartiality requires us to ignore the ties we inev-
itably have to other people. Fletcher proposes instead that ethics be 
rooted in the real affiliations people have with each other in the real 
world. Such an approach would, he claims, respect the "natural limits 
of sympathy" between people (p. 21). Although Fletcher repeatedly 
asserts, again somewhat incoherently, that "relationships [are] logi-
cally prior to the individual" (p. 15; emphasis added), what he appar-
ently intends to stress is not logic, but the implications of the view that 
personal identity is socially constructed. Loyalty is defined as "an ob-
ligation implied in every person's sense of being historically rooted in a 
set of defining familial, institutional, and national relationships" (p. 
21). Fletcher argues that our most powerful moral obligations are 
owed to those "groups and individuals that have entered into our sense 
of who we are" (p. 16). Responding to those obligations leads us to 
treat others appropriately and, even more importantly, becomes a mat-
ter of honoring ourselves by acknowledging the unique sources of our 
identity (pp. 16, 87). 
In general outline, much in Fletcher's argument is attractive. But 
his challenge to impartial ethical theories benefits from his cursory 
treatment of the theories he rejects. Although he cites the works of 
other theorists such as Michael Walzer, Fletcher's treatment of their 
work is remarkably superficial.3 Moreover, he fails to discuss the ways 
in which those systems that he categorizes as "impartial ethics" have 
been developed to respond to the claims of affiliation. In fact, he 
seems completely unaware of the existence of arguments that these 
systems can accommodate partiality.4 
Fletcher talks about academics who "have become like baseball stars, willing to play for the 
highest bidder." P. 4. Fletcher himself has been a member of the permanent faculty of four 
schools and visited at five more. See AssOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCH., THE AALS DIRECTORY 
OF LAW TEACHERS, 1992-93, at 368 (1992). 
3. E.g .. pp. 18-20. 
4. For example, within the deontological tradition, see THOMAS NAGLE, THE VIEW FROM 
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The core of Fletcher's work is not his critique of impartial alterna-
tives, but his development of an explicitly and predominantly partial 
approach. The persuasiveness of this approach turns on whether his 
concept of loyalty helps us think fruitfully about moral questions. In 
what follows, I will explore that concept - first, in light of Fletcher's 
effort to distinguish between two sorts of personal loyalties; second, in 
the context of his extremely brief foray into the ethics of marriage and 
motherhood; and finally, in an extended discussion of his analysis of 
loyalty and the state. Fletcher turns out to have a peculiarly narrow 
view of which loyalties are worth protecting. The book's basic argu-
ment - that ethics ought to accommodate personal affiliations - is 
developed through examples that reflect the author's own biases in 
ways that he cannot have intended, for the end result is a powerful 
demonstration of the limitations of partial thinking. 
To begin with, Fletcher's description of the "dimensions of loy-
alty" is deeply gendered. When he starts to explore the moral quality 
of loyalty, Fletcher begins with love. He draws examples from litera-
ture rather than life, and the choices he makes focus almost exclu-
sively on the loyalty of women to men: the love of Cordelia for Lear, 
Solveig for Peer Gynt, Antigone for Polyneices, Penelope for Ulysses. 
With the exception of Antigone, who is motivated at least in part by 
principle, these women represent a loyalty that Fletcher describes as 
simple: "better suited for the theater than for subtle and intricate psy-
chological novels" (p. 26); "an emotional, almost instinctive attach-
ment, untempered by moral reflection about the right thing to do" (p. 
31); "the nonrational embracing of the other" (p. 31) that takes the 
form of "selfless devotion to others" or "patient[ ] waiting" (p. 32). 
Such devotion gives significance to the lives of the women, though 
Fletcher sees in it no larger importance. Fletcher is not unselfcon-
scious about this: he is aware that he is describing a selfless devotion 
attributed almost exclusively to women (p. 31). But he completely ig-
nores that these are women portrayed in fiction by male authors. He 
accepts a romanticized, belittling picture of the love of women and is 
oblivious to the way in which male expectations of female loyalty can 
constrain women, limiting them to passivity in the nonfictional world. 
Fletcher makes no moral claims for this "women's loyalty." In 
fact, he explicitly denies its moral force: for the most part, "[t]here is 
no claim of truth or divine command that . . . justifies the action. 
There is no point to the loyalty except the loving attachment to the 
other" (p. 32). These women are not acting ethically but "naturally," 
instinctively. In contrast, Fletcher points to a higher form of loyalty, 
"notable in political and corporate life, [which] adds a factor of ideo-
logical commitment to the emotion of attachment" (p. 33). This sort 
NOWHERE (1986), and, within the consequentialist tradition, see Peter Railton's excellent article, 
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134 (1984). 
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of loyalty can be found in the bonds between man and man. The para-
digm is described in terms that echo military solidarity: it includes 
relationships of hierarchy and obedience, such as that between foot 
soldiers and generals, and relationships of reciprocity, among, for ex-
ample, the members of a combat unit (p. 33). Adopting a deep-rooted 
gender stereotype, Fletcher describes these loyalties, in contrast to the 
love of women, as based on will and reason as well as emotion. They 
grow out of commitment to a cause. 
This initial effort to think through the different forms that loyalty 
might take draws too strong a distinction between familial love and 
group solidarity. Surely moral choices and emotions play a role in 
both affiliations. Fletcher's focus on women waiting for men leaves 
out too much. Obligations based on reason and will, as well as affec-
tion, arise between husbands and wives, and between parents and chil-
dren, and unthinking, emotional attachments to groups are not 
unknown. The dichotomy between love and solidarity is also at odds 
with Fletcher's overall effort, for he apparently hopes to argue that 
familial and group loyalties are similar in ways that call for a similar 
response from the state: "I broaden the notion of the private sphere, 
secure against state interference, to include relationships expressing 
personal and religious loyalties" (p. 77). 
Fletcher hopes to draw on his intuition that we understand and 
respect the instinct to put one's family first in arguing that we should 
understand and respect parallel claims of loyalty to larger groups. In 
describing the demands of loyalty, he mixes examples from family life 
with questions of patriotism and treason. Yet Fletcher pays very little 
attention to the actual merits of the claims of familial obligation. Af-
ter the initial, definitional chapters there is only one page on marital 
fidelity and a longer section, almost five pages, on surrogate mother-
ing. Perhaps Fletcher considers extended analysis unnecessary, for he 
focuses again on the loyalty of women, which he has categorized as the 
proper subject of nature rather than reason and morality. The argu-
ment misfires because he has a romanticized view of female devotion. 
Loyalty in marriage is reduced, for Fletcher, to sexual fidelity, and 
he is primarily interested in why women have begun to demand fidel-
ity from men. 5 Fletcher never mentions the possibility that these de-
mands are based on the economic and social dependence of women on 
men. Dependence of this sort is not new, so it does not explain what 
Fletcher sees as the recent increase in demands of fidelity; perhaps 
women have begun to achieve just enough autonomy to voice a de-
mand that they have felt, but not articulated, for a long time. Fletcher 
5. The historical male expectation of fidelity from women is dismissed as less interesting and 
attributed to "the male interest in securing their blood line and being assured of a heir of their 
body." P. 76. Once again loyalty of women to men is pretty much taken for granted. "Of 
greater concern" is loyalty demanded by women from men. P. 76. 
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also thinks that, even in the age of AIDS, fears of sexual disease are 
not an adequate explanation "for the pain that lovers feel upon learn-
ing that their partners share sexual intimacy with others" (p. 76). Sex, 
Fletcher suggests, is valued as a ritual ofloyalty. It is a "confirmation 
of the underlying relationship of emotional devotion .... a rite of plea-
sure that overcomes each partner's recurrent doubts whether the other 
is fully there" (p. 76). This assumes too easily that sex is unproblemat-
ically pleasurable and that it lies at the core of marriage. What sort of 
relationship does sex ritually enact? Does marital loyalty demand 
something more than sexual fidelity? Why is sex rather than attention 
to the whole personality the best indication of "whether the other is 
fully there"? Does Fletcher mean to suggest that this "ritualist confir-
mation" is what sex means for women, but not for men? Why do 
people (for example, battered women) who do not derive "profound 
pleasure" from sex with their partners still feel betrayed by adultery? 
Fletcher also sees maternal devotion as self-evident and un-
problematic. He cites the enforcement of surrogacy contracts as an 
example of a legal approach that is insensitive to the demands of loy-
alty (pp. 82-87). The key mistake in the Baby M case, he thinks, was 
failing to tell the hospital that Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate 
mother, should not be allowed any contact with her child. Once she 
held the newborn baby, a relationship of loyalty between mother and 
child was created that could not be disrupted without "consequences 
disastrous to [Mrs. Whitehead's] self-esteem" (p. 87). This characteri-
zation of the problem removes Mrs. Whitehead as a rational actor in 
the situation. Once the mother is allowed to hold the baby, her reac-
tion is inevitable. Fletcher acknowledges that this bond between 
mother and child has ethical implications; he describes it as giving rise 
to a sense of "duty" to care for the child. Once more, however, he 
attributes the loyalty of women to nature rather than reason: he de-
scribes the duty to keep the child and care for it as flowing out of "the 
experiential connection of carrying the child to term and nurturing it 
after birth" (p. 86). Would there be no duty if the mother had not 
held the child? 
Fletcher offers no indication that Mrs. Whitehead's decision might 
be, even in part, the sort that is appropriately the subject of ethical 
reflection. Is it obvious that a mother who chooses to give up a child 
is acting disloyally toward that child? Might there not be some situa-
tions in which a mother would feel that the best way to care for the 
child was to allow it to be raised in a more secure home? Wasn't Mrs. 
Whitehead, in fleeing with the child after taking her from the Sterns, 
motivated at least as much by a sense of entitlement as by a sense of 
obligation? How does the language of "loyalty" help us to resolve 
these questions? 
Fletcher makes the term do too much and not enough. "Loyalty" 
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covers affection, fidelity, obedience, responsibility, affiliation, and self-
esteem. But he does not use the concept to answer questions about 
personal obligation with any precision. Fletcher is not really con-
cerned with those questions. He is more interested in the role that 
loyalty should play in decisions made by the state. He argues, first, 
that the state should respect certain relationships of loyalty and, sec-
ond, that the state can use legal sanctions to create loyalty among its 
citizens. 
Both arguments draw on the analogy to the natural, unwilled loy-
alty of women to men and mothers to children. The love of women 
bears a resemblance to higher connections, based on reason as well as 
emotion, that bind members of some groups to each other and citizens 
to their state. The inevitability and strength of loyalty attachments, 
exemplified in the love of women which has the force of nature, means 
that the state simply cannot ignore such ties without doing great 
psychic damage to its citizens. Moreover, the nonrational nature of 
these bonds, exemplified by their creation and affirmation through the 
rituals of sex and nursing, indicates that the state may be able to pro-
mote loyalty to itself by building devotion through its own rituals of 
patriotism. 
When addressing the first question, concerning state respect for 
personal loyalties, Fletcher rejects the view that an individual's asser-
tion of a claim based on loyalty is sufficient to trigger special defer-
ence. Although he suggests that skepticism about assertions of loyalty 
is needed to weed out claims made in bad faith, Fletcher also seems to 
be motivated by his belief that not all loyalties are, in fact, equally 
worthy of protection. Fletcher's discussion of family relationships has 
already suggested this narrowness of focus, but the extent to which his 
biases limit his perspective first becomes clear in his discussion of the 
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Fletcher argues that the best 
account of the deferential approach to religion embodied in this clause 
emphasizes loyalty: the Free Exercise Clause is an expression of re-
spect for the loyalty of the individual to a transcendental authority (p. 
95). However, "for a claim of higher loyalty to be plausible, it must be 
embedded in a community practice." There must be "some objective 
manifestation of what the higher power demands," so loyalty to God 
"becomes interwoven with loyalty to a community and fidelity to a 
tradition" (p. 95). This approach is insensitive to the Protestant 
Christian tradition, which stresses the individual's personal relation-
ship with God, and it raises the possibility that genuine religious loyal-
ties will be ignored because they are grounded in traditions that 
Fletcher does not recognize. For example, he makes much of the case 
of a Native American who refused to obtain a Social Security number 
for his child because his tribal chief said it would rob the child of her 
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spirit. 6 In the context of the particular case, the claim of religious 
authority may have been implausible, but Fletcher rejects any possibil-
ity that "the opinion of one chief, as interpreted by one man" (p. 96) 
could, without more, make out a claim of religious loyalty; he finds 
this argument absurd even if made sincerely. Fletcher demands some-
thing with a stronger "rooting in [the] community" (p. 97). He ig-
nores the possibility that there is a strong community tradition of 
relying on interpretations of "the opinion of one chief." In fact, 
Fletcher seems to feel truly comfortable only with religious claims that 
have a textual basis, claims that are grounded in "a biblical passage or 
its equivalent" (p. 99). Loyalties without such a pedigree are based 
not on religion but on "independently motivated customs and convic-
tions" (p. 99). 
Fletcher's insistence on an historical pedigree is not simply a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation. Within his general ethical struc-
ture, he means to recognize only those loyalties grounded in long-
standing historical traditions. 7 This is due in part to his fear that less 
firmly rooted loyalties could be claimed too easily, but it is also a con-
sequence of the confused connection he draws between the history of 
individuals and the history of groups. Fletcher's focus on loyalties de-
rives from his recognition that we are not isolated individuals but 
humans created by affiliations with other humans. Each of us has, in 
Fletcher's words, a "historical self." Acknowledging our roots is a 
way of acknowledging ourselves; so much is unremarkable. But 
Fletcher then appears to assume that only roots to distinct and identi-
fiable social groups with established histories count (pp. 16-18). The 
"historical self" seems, to him, to be constituted by historical groups 
rather than by the individual's personal history. Loyalties that are not 
historically based are insignificant to self-identity. 
How far Fletcher means to push this distinction among loyalties is 
unclear. It leads him to be ambivalent, for example, about the need to 
respect affiliations acquired through choice rather than birth. Fletcher 
acknowledges that not every switch in allegiance is a betrayal, but he 
does not tell us how we can distinguish the breach of an obligation of 
loyalty from the acquisition of a new affiliation. 8 When it comes to 
occupational affiliations, Fletcher gives mixed signals. He dismisses 
lawyers' claims that they owe a professional loyalty to their clients on 
6. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). The Social Security number was required as part 
of the process of applying for welfare benefits. 
7. See, e.g., pp. 137, 155. 
8. He is rather obtuse about one particular example of cultural redefinition. Fletcher points 
to the German constitutional decision that invalidated a liberal abortion law under a provision 
granting "everyone a right to life" as representing a judicial effort to identify the court "with 
what it took to be a humanist, life-affirming current in German culture." P. 65. Yet the decision 
could just as well represent the opposite: an effort by the German court to distance itself from 
the brutal, life-denying experience of the Holocaust in German history. 
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the grounds that these obligations "derive solely from contract, from 
voluntary commitments, not from an historical self" (p. 22). Yet he 
praises an academic lawyer, Randall Kennedy, for placing his profes-
sional loyalty to "an all-encompassing academic and intellectual com-
munity" above his ties to his ethnic group of African Americans (p. 
160). 
Oddly, in a book arguing that law and morals must often defer to 
personal loyalties, particularly those loyalties rooted in birth and biol-
ogy, Fletcher reserves his harshest criticism for advocates of "mul-
ticulturalism." He defines "multiculturalism" as the claim that ethnic 
or racial identity "dominates all the others," and he is willing to grant 
the justice of this claim only to those who live in places of extreme 
racial division where "the circles of religion, language, and historical 
consciousness tend to converge" (p. 155). The claim is inappropriate, 
he thinks, when made by those who live in a "pluralistic" country like 
the United States. If "multiculturalism" asserts "that we ... are no 
more than distinct nations living side by side" (p. 156), then Fletcher 
may appropriately mistrust it as a general description of life through-
out the United States. But the claim may be accurate for certain sec-
tions of the nation, and race can surely be personality-defining in our 
culture. Fletcher's resistance to that idea seems, once more, to come 
down to an unnecessarily narrow definition of which groups can be 
properly regarded as the subject ofloyalty. He makes no argument for 
his assertion that racial identification is of critical importance to per-
sonal identity only when "religion, language, and historical conscious-
ness ... converge," and he simultaneously seems oblivious to the ways 
in which precisely that sort of convergence can be found among Afri-
can Americans and other minority groups in the United States. 
Fletcher's discussion of the case of Randall Kennedy clearly dem-
onstrates that he is not simply rejecting an "enclave" version of racial 
identity. In fact, he is unsympathetic to a wide range of appeals for 
ethnic group representation in the intellectual and educational life of 
our culture. Professor Kennedy became the subject of controversy 
when he published an article in the Harvard Law Review critical of the 
claim that legal scholarship by authors from a variety of racial and 
ethnic backgrounds is intrinsically valuable.9 The response to this ar-
ticle from other African-American law professors interests Fletcher 
because he sees it as charging Kennedy with disloyalty. Fletcher's 
analysis of this very painful debate is troubling not because he sides 
with Kennedy, but because his characterization of the motives of Ken-
nedy's critics reveals how little he appreciates their sense of the con-
nection between personal identity and group affiliation. First, Fletcher 
dismisses the claim that members of an ethnic or racial group might 
9. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 
(1989). 
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have something unique to say because they are witnesses to a particu-
lar experience. He sees this as "a denial that individuals speak in their 
personal and distinctive voice" (p. 157) - an odd insistence on the 
distinction between social influences and personal identity in a book 
that has been stressing all along how individuality is constructed out 
of affiliations. Therefore, Fletcher decides, the claims that Kennedy is 
disloyal to his race must reflect something much more mercenary: "If 
race ... is not a qualification [for academic employment], then obvi-
ously candidates who might benefit from this factor will receive fewer 
jobs . . . . This is precisely the point that . . . makes his blackness 
rhetorically relevant and allegedly disloyal to his 'community' " (p. 
158). In other words, the loyalty at stake here is something like nepo-
tism, rather than loyalty to a particular perspective. Fletcher believes 
that Kennedy's critics are only seriously concerned with getting jobs. 
Fletcher thinks that group affiliations are irrelevant to academic 
discourse because this is an arena in which impartiality is appropriate. 
He argues that the appeal to multiculturalism confuses belief, which 
can be plural and culture-dependent, with truth, which must be 
reached through "neutral and universal discourse" (p. 174). Belief can 
properly be the subject of loyalty, but truth cannot. Fletcher draws 
this distinction too rigidly. He ignores the ways in which knowledge 
can be as partial as emotional ties. Just as we develop as individuals 
with affiliations to particular religions or particular nations, we also 
develop as individuals with limited experiences of the world. Fletcher 
is correct when he states that, "[f]or an argument to be worth making, 
it must be cast in a language that appeals to those who have no loyal-
ties to the proponent" (p. 174). But the insight that gives birth to a 
particular line of thought may come from an experience that not eve-
ryone shares. Moreover, a people may change its understanding of its 
own history - see, for example, the revision in American views of the 
relationship between Native Americans and European settlers - be-
cause it comes to see that the old interpretation was formed by a lim-
ited perspective. 
Fletcher is struggling with the difficult question of how a common 
culture can be nurtured in the United States. He acknowledges that 
an American national culture must be pluralistic, and he distinguishes 
what is acceptable in this country from the view found among certain 
French intellectuals that education ought to be aggressively secular, 
designed to "offer[ ] all children an opportunity to liberate themselves 
from their communities of origin" (p. 108). Yet Fletcher finds the 
teaching of national loyalty to be powerfully appealing. What worries 
him most about "multiculturalism" is the possibility that it will en-
courage students to favor their racial identity over their national citi-
zenship. Fletcher is troubled not by the creation of loyalties, but by 
the particular loyalties that this perspective tries to inculcate. 
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In fact, Fletcher argues that we have become unnecessarily reluc-
tant to use governmental authority to inspire devotion to appropriate 
loyalties. National loyalty can be inspired by rituals, such as the reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance, and by symbols, such as the flag. 
The second question Fletcher asks with regard to loyalty and the state 
is: To what extent can the law be used not only to encourage and 
respect affiliations, but affirmatively to require participation in rituals 
and respect for symbols that will build affiliations? 
Fletcher finds mandatory recitations of the Pledge more troubling 
than criminal sanctions for flag burning, and once again his conclu-
sions seem based at least as much on his personal history as on argu-
ment. Fletcher introduces this book with a story. Challenged at a 
border crossing where he found himself without a passport, he is asked 
to prove his citizenship by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. As the 
words remembered from elementary school return, he is reminded of 
the way in which patriotic rituals "nurture and maintain a common 
national identity and a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the 
nation as a whole" (p. xi). But Fletcher also has a negative experience 
with compulsory pledges. As an employee of Columbia University, he 
is required by state law to sign an oath of allegiance. Though this oath 
consists of promises of future behavior ("I will support the Constitu-
tion ... and ... I will faithfully discharge the duties ... " of a Profes-
sor of Law (p. 67)), Fletcher thinks the oath "ludicrous" and 
"demeaning," resonant of the loyalty oaths used in the McCarthy pe-
riod to "weed[] out the politically unreliable" (pp. 67-68). In the ab-
sence of ritual, the requirement that he sign the oath seems to Fletcher 
to indicate only government suspicion of his past loyalty. But when 
set in a different context - for example, recited by a class of children 
as an opening to the school day- the Pledge "is surely not [designed] 
to test the loyalty of the young but rather, by a process of ritualized 
expression of respect, to instill an emotional attachment to their coun-
try" (p. 104). 
Fletcher finds this educational ritual entirely appropriate. He ac-
knowledges the constitutional limits on the extent to which it can be 
made mandatory; they are based on the deference required by the Free 
Exercise Clause to conflicting loyalties "to an external authority, 
namely, to the perceived word of God, as interpreted in a religious 
community" (p. 123). But mere "fidelity to one's inner convictions is 
not so respected"; objections to the Pledge based on conflicting loyal-
ties not rooted in religious orthodoxy need not be given deference. 
Fletcher suggests, for instance, that "abstaining students" might re-
ceive lower grades because they have refused, without a basis in estab-
lished religious doctrine, to participate in an educational activity of the 
school; dismissal from school goes too far even for him (p. 124). Once 
more, Fletcher seems insensitive to loyalties that he does not share. 
His distaste for the New York oath of allegiance is understandable. 
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But the psychic injury and disrespect that he finds implicit in the oath 
requirement is not obviously more serious than that suffered by a 
fourth grader who finds herself penalized because her family's objec-
tions to the Pledge are not sufficiently rooted in doctrine. 
When it comes to punishing flag burning, Fletcher is not so ambiv-
alent, for he thinks the act is itself disloyal. Flag burning is not, to 
Fletcher, a victimless crime. It is an offense against the community -
destruction of the flag is "a violation of our collective sense of what is 
permissible in our public space" (p. 147), an infringement on "the 
community's shared interest in cultivating the values of reciprocal loy-
alty and solidarity" {p. 149). Fletcher thinks that the First Amend-
ment arguments against the criminalization of flag burning are 
misplaced because promoting "a flag culture" does not involve the im-
position of any particular political belief. Instead it is "a legitimate 
effort to promote a neutral interest in national solidarity" (pp. 140-
41). But Fletcher cannot have it both ways: if protecting the flag is an 
important expression of national solidarity, this protection is not "neu-
tral." Those who burn the flag are questioning and challenging the 
very idea that Fletcher wants to promote - that the United States is a 
unified nation or one deserving of loyalty. Yet again Fletcher decides 
a difficult question too quickly because he gives his own allegiances 
(here, loyalty to flag and country) great weight, while failing to appre-
ciate the strength of the views of others. 
Fletcher recognizes the "moral hazard" in loyalty, that it may lead 
to blind preference for one's own group over the legitimate interests of 
others. "The greatest sin ofloyalty, of course, is war" (p. 151). But he 
can offer at most only vague and unsatisfying suggestions for re-
straining the imperialist tendencies of group affiliation. Some checks, 
he thinks, will come from the conflicting demands of competing loyal-
ties upon an individual with multiple affiliations. Others will come 
from the demarcation of certain arenas, such as the courts, where jus-
tice, rather than loyalty, should prevail. But the way these restraints 
will operate is expressed only in the most general, aspirational terms. 
Significantly, Fletcher also calls on impartial moral theories as a po-
tential source of limits on loyalty. But he has already dismissed those 
approaches as insufficiently sensitive to the claims of partiality, and he 
has no clear sense of the extent to which they should be resurrected. 
Fletcher makes a passing suggestion that a mixed ethical system com-
posed of both partial and impartial theories would be ideal, but the 
form that system might take is not spelled out in any detail. Finally, 
he presents exit from a group which demands too much loyalty as a 
moral alternative. That solution, however, does not address the moral 
hazard problem. Exit is an alternative for someone who no longer 
agrees with the values of the group; it is not responsive to the danger 
that someone will believe in the values of the group too much. 
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The great danger of partiality is that we will not be aware of how it 
limits our vision. We will find our own affiliations worthy of respect 
and deference and dismiss the ties of others as too tenuous, idiosyn-
cratic, or divisive to merit similar protection. Fletcher sees this dan-
ger, but, in this book, he also exemplifies it. 
